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set in the portfolio is the house where she lives in the context of a life-cycle model.
The mortgage is modelled as an adjustable rate contract covering the remaining
life of the house owner. Thus, re￿nancing concerns only the size of the mortgage,
which can be adjusted in any period subject to a constraint on the amount that
can be borrowed: the value of the new mortgage cannot exceed the latest realised
price. The paper solves the model analytically and then numerically calibrates the
re￿nancing decision.
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11 Introduction
Home equity is the most widely held asset and, therefore, an important component of
household wealth in many countries. In the U.K., the typical consumer is a homeowner
and the majority of her wealth is locked into the house. The role of housing is made
more complicated by the fact that it serves a double purpose: it is both an investment
vehicle that allows investors to hold home equity and a durable consumption good from
which the owner derives utility. In addition, moving house involves high transaction
costs and this makes the trading infrequent. However, home equity may still act as a
buffer against bad income shocks by serving as collateral for secured loans and through
remortgaging, borrowers can alter their debt position without moving their properties.
Figure 1 shows that in recent years household borrowing secured against housing has
risen by a considerably greater amount than that needed to fund new housing invest-
ments1.
The equity that consumers release from the value of their home may be used to
invest in other assets in order to rebalance the portfolio (￿nancial motivation) or to
￿nance consumer spending (consumption smoothing motivation). A recent stream of
the literature has shown that the reasons why investors may choose to re￿nance and
the extent to which they do so largely depend on the amount of liquid assets that they
hold. Hurst and Stafford (2004), using micro data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics for the US, ￿nd that households who experience a spell of unemployment
1The Bank of England’s estimate of mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW) measures that part of consumer
borrowing from mortgage lenders that is not invested in the housing market. MEW takes the income in
housing ￿nance (net mortgage lending and capital grants) and subtracts households’ investments in housing
(purchases of new houses and houses from other sectors, improvements to property and the transaction costs
of moving house).
2Figure 1: Bank of England’s estimate of mortgage equity withdrawal
and have zero liquid assets are 25% more likely to re￿nance. Their empirical evidence
seems to suggest that, on average, such households convert most of the equity that they
remove through re￿nancing into current consumption. On the contrary, non-liquidity
constrained households re￿nance driven by ￿nancial reasons and reallocate the equity
to other portfolio components. This result is partly consistent with the ￿ndings of
Vass and Smith (2004) that, using data from the Survey of English Housing, show that
for low-income households the amount of equity withdrawn is proportionately larger
relative to income than for higher income groups.
This paper analyses the optimal re￿nancing decision of an agent whose only as-
set in the portfolio is the house where she lives in the context of a life-cycle model:
the investor can borrow only through the mortgage (i.e. using the house as collateral)
and saving is precluded by assumption. The no saving hypothesis might seem dif￿cult
to justify; however, data from the Family Resources Survey show that there is a large
number of households who are homeowners but whose savings are negligible [INSERT
3TABLE]. Furthermore, this assumption is needed to abstract from any portfolio consid-
erations and to focus only on the use of mortgage re￿nancing as a mechanism by which
individuals smooth consumption over time. Since in the model there are no other as-
sets but the house, the only reason why investors remortgage is to smooth consumption.
The mortgage is modelled as an adjustable rate contract covering the remaining life of
the house owner. Thus, re￿nancing concerns only the size of the mortgage, which can
be adjusted in any period subject to a constraint on the amount that can be borrowed:
the value of the new mortgage cannot exceed the latest realised price. The re￿nancing
may either involve increasing (mortgage equity withdrawal) or reducing (mortgage eq-
uity injection) the outstanding debt. Under the assumption of no uncertainty, I derive
an analytical solution to the problem and then I numerically calibrate the re￿nancing
decision. Though there are costs to obtaining the closed-form solution, such as the no
savings assumption, the bene￿t is that the solution is easy to interpret and I gain several
economic insights. The theoretical results are consistent with the empirical evidence
of Hurst and Stafford (2004) for the US and Smith and Vass (2004) for the UK: when
current income is low with respect to future income, consumers with no ￿nancial assets
in their portfolios respond by releasing equity from their house and, by doing so, they
smooth consumption over time.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 lays out the model in the case in
which re￿nancing the mortgage is costless. Section 3 derives the optimal re￿nancing
policy. Section 4 extends the model by introducing a ￿xed transaction cost that has to
be paid to adjust the mortgage size. Section 5 presents calibrated simulations. Section
6 concludes.
42 The model assumptions
To explore the use of home equity as a mechanism by which individuals smooth their
consumption over time, I assume that households can borrow only through the mort-
gage and the only asset in their portfolio is the house where they live. Consumers live
for a ￿nite period of time and the length of life (T) is known in advance. In every
period before the ￿nal one (t < T), the budget constraint is:
ct = wt + (1 ￿ ￿t)Mt+1 ￿ Mt (1)
where ct is consumption of period t, wt is labour income, Mt is the mortgage debt and
￿t the mortgage rate, which is time-varying but perfectly foreseen.
Since borrowings and savings in a ￿nancial asset are precluded by assumption,
individuals maximise life-time utility through their mortgage decisions: in each period
they can costlessly redeem their existing mortgage (Mt) and take out a new loan with
maturity date T (Mt+1), where Mt+1 = Mt if no re￿nancing is undertaken2. The only
source of imperfection in the mortgage market is that the new loan cannot exceed the
latest realised price pt.
For tractability, I assume that lifetime preferences are additive and the instanta-






2Therefore, when the optimal mortgage is equal to the current mortgage, consumers have to pay off their
existing debt and take out a new loan of the same size. This is without loss of generality since re￿nancing is
costless.
5where ￿ > 0 is the rate of time preference. By excluding labour income and housing
from the utility function, I implicitly assume that housing is homogeneous (agents
occupy a house of a ￿xed size and quality throughout their life) and that there is an
inelastic labour supply. In addition, I do not include any form of uncertainty; thus, the
mortgage rate ￿t, labour income wt and house prices pt may be time varying, but are
perfectly foreseen.
In the last period (T), any outstanding mortgage is paid off and the house is sold
at the price pT. Since I abstract from bequests and inheritances, there is no issue of
re￿nancing for period T + 1 :
cT = wT ￿ MT + pT
and the value function is
VT = u(cT) = u(wT ￿ MT + pT)
3 The optimal re￿nancing policy








u(wT￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿T￿1)MT ￿ MT￿1) + ￿u(wT ￿ MT + pT)
For periods before T ￿ 1, the value function at t can be de￿ned recursively as:













where 0 < Mt+1 < pt. In each period consumers choose the optimal mortgage to carry
into next period, given their labour income, the value of their house, the mortgage rate
and their rate of time preference. As shown in ￿gure 2, three cases arise, depending on
the sign of the derivative of ￿t with respect to Mt+1. In particular, the consumer pays












> 0 and she choose a mortgage size that solves @￿t




= u0(ct)(1 ￿ ￿t) ￿ ￿u0(ct+1) (2)
Proof. See the appendix.
Therefore, in any period before the ￿nal one the consumer chooses a maximum
mortgage if the marginal utility of withdrawing equity from the house in the current
period is higher than the future discounted marginal disutility of having to pay off the
debt. At t < T ￿ 1:
u0(wt + (1 ￿ ￿t)pt ￿ Mt)(1 ￿ ￿t) > ￿u0(wt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t+1)Mt+2 ￿ pt)
On the contrary, the individual pays off the loan if
u0(wt ￿ Mt)(1 ￿ ￿t) < ￿u0(wt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t+1)Mt+2)
Otherwise there is an interior mortgage that solves
u0(wt + (1 ￿ ￿t)Mt+1 ￿ Mt)(1 ￿ ￿t) = ￿u0(wt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t+1)Mt+2 ￿ Mt+1)
Proposition 2 If the consumer is ￿time neutral￿ (￿ = 1 ￿ ￿t = 1 ￿ ￿), in any period
8before the ￿nal one the optimal re￿nancing policy is as follows. De￿ne:
Ft = wt+1 ￿ wt + Mt + (1 ￿ ￿)Mt+2 for t = 1:::T ￿ 2 (3)




> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if Ft < 0
pt if Ft > (2 ￿ ￿)pt
Ft
2￿￿ otherwise
Proof. It follows directly from the fact that u0(wt +(1￿￿)Mt+1 ￿Mt) Q u0(wt+1 +
(1￿￿)Mt+2￿Mt+1) implies wt+(1￿￿)Mt+1￿Mt Q wt+1+(1￿￿)Mt+2￿Mt+1:
Proposition 2 states that the extent to which time-neutral consumers re￿nance de-
pends positively on the wage differential: the lower the current wage relatively to the
future wage, the higher the optimal size of the mortgage. This result is consistent with
the empirical evidence of Hurst and Stafford (2004) for the US and of Smith and Vass
(2004) for the UK: consumers with low current income and with no assets in their
portfolios are those who release more equity from the house.
Corollary 2.1 If wages are non-decreasing, the corner solution Mt = 0 is always
suboptimal.
Proof. Refer to (3). If wt+1 > wt, Ft > 0 since Mt and Mt+2 are bounded to be
non-negative.
9Corollary 2.2 If ￿ = 1￿ ￿t and wages are constant, the optimal re￿nancing policy is
given by
Mt+1 = pt if Ft > (2 ￿ ￿)pt
Mt+1 =
Mt + (1 ￿ ￿)Mt+2
2 ￿ ￿
> 0 otherwise
That is, the mortgage at t + 1 is either pt or a weighted average of the mortgage at
t and the mortgage at t + 2. It should be noted that if the investor chooses an interior
solution for n ￿ 3 subsequent periods, the optimal mortgage solves a second order












































10where A and B are given by the initial conditions. Since the root m2 is greater than 1,
the equation is unstable and Mt will tend to decrease or grow exponentially over time
depending on the sign of A. However, this is prevented by the upper and lower bounds
on Mt+1 (0 ￿ Mt+1 ￿ pt) and the constraint that at T the individual has to die without
any debt.
Another important implication of proposition 1 is that when current labour income
is low and investors respond by withdrawing equity, by doing so they smooth consump-
tion over time. However, even if in the model there is no uncertainty, individuals might
be prevented from smoothing consumption completely by the constraint on the amount
of equity that can be withdrawn from the house: 0 ￿ Mt+1 ￿ pt.
From the budget constraint (1), I derive equation (5), which links consumption in
period t and t + 1 and thus it de￿nes the evolution of consumption over the life-cycle:
￿ct+1 = ct+1 ￿ ct = wt+1 ￿ wt + (1 ￿ ￿)Mt+2 ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)Mt+1 + Mt (5)
= Ft ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)Mt+1
where ￿ct+1 = 0 only if there is an interior solution for the mortgage.
3.1 CARA utility function
To ￿nd a closed-form solution to the problem in the more general case in which the
consumer is not necessarily time-neutral, one needs to specify the form of the utility
11function. First, assume that the instantaneous utility function has a CARA form:
u(ct) = 1 ￿ exp(￿bct) (6)





s￿t(1 ￿ exp(￿b(ws + (1 ￿ ￿s)Ms+1 ￿ Ms)))
+￿
T￿t(1 ￿ exp(￿b(wT ￿ MT + pT)))]
= maxvt
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Proof. From equation 2
@vt
@Mt+1
= b(1 ￿ ￿t)exp(￿b(wt + (1 ￿ ￿t)Mt+1 ￿ Mt))
￿￿bexp(￿b(wt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t+1)Mt+2 ￿ Mt+1))
12and Mt+1 = 0 when @vt
@Mt+1 at 0 is negative, Mt+1 = pt when @vt
@Mt+1 at pt is positive
and it is an interior solution otherwise, where
@vt
@Mt+1
S 0 if (1 ￿ ￿t)exp(￿b(wt + (1 ￿ ￿t)Mt+1 ￿ Mt)) S
￿exp(￿b(wt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t+1)Mt+2 ￿ Mt+1))









+ wt+1 ￿ wt + Mt + (1 ￿ ￿t+1)Mt+2 S (2 ￿ ￿t)Mt+1
where the RHS is the function FCA
t de￿ned in the proposition
Proposition 5 states that the extent to which consumers re￿nance depends not only





. Ceteris paribus, the more impatient the consumer, the higher will be the








t = ￿1 if 1 ￿ ￿t < ￿
This means that when b ! 0 an impatient consumer will take out a maximum mort-
gage, while a patient one will redeem any outstanding debt. Therefore, risk-neutral
consumers always choose a corner solution and the optimal mortgage policy is bang-
bang: Mt+1 is either 0 or pt depending on the individual degree of impatience.
13Corollary 3.1 If the investor chooses an interior solution for n ￿ 3 subsequent peri-
ods, the optimal mortgage solves a second order non-homogeneous difference equation















￿ wt+1 + wt
Since the time horizon is ￿nite, it is possible to solve this equation backwards.
Corollary 3.2 If wages are non-decreasing and ￿ ￿ 1￿￿t, the corner solution Mt =
0 is always suboptimal.
Proof. Refer to the de￿nition of FCA
t . Since the mortgage is always non-negative, if
wt+1 > wt and ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿t, then FCA
t > 0.
This means that if the wage today is lower than the wage tomorrow and if agents
highly discount the future (they are "impatient"), it is never optimal to pay off the
mortgage. This result is the extension of corollary 3 to an impatient consumer in the
case of a CARA per-period felicity function.
CARA utility is often considered theoretically unattractive because it does not rule
out negative consumption (u0(0) > 0). However, it is possible to prove that in this
framework consumption is always non-negative, at least in the case of a time-neutral
or impatient consumer.
Proposition 4 For a time-neutral or impatient investor, consumption is always non-
negative.
14Proof. Since ct positively depends on Mt+1, to prove that consumption is always
non-negative is equivalent to prove that ct > 0 when Mt+1 = 0. If Mt+1, then











ct ￿ ct+1 = wt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t+1)Mt+2 ￿ 0
Therefore, most of the results derived in the case of a time-neutral consumer hold
also for a impatient individual.
3.2 CRRA utility function







where ￿ is the coef￿cient of relative risk aversion. The isoelastic utility function is
usually preferred to the CARA speci￿cation because it implies a positive level of con-
sumption.
Proposition 5 With a CRRA utility function, the optimal re￿nancing policy is as fol-
15lows. De￿ne:
FCR
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Proof. From equation 2:
@vt
@Mt+1




wt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t+1)Mt+2 ￿ Mt+1
￿￿￿
Hence, Mt+1 = 0 if




wt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t+1)Mt+2 ￿ pt
￿￿￿
> 0
16and Mt+1 = 0 if




wt+1 + (1 ￿ ￿t+1)Mt+2
￿￿￿
< 0
Otherwise, there is an interior solution:




















(1 ￿ ￿t) + 1
￿
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wt. This result is the analogue of corollary 7 in the case of an
isoelastic utility function.
174 The model with transaction costs
In this section I extend the previous model by allowing for a second source of imper-
fection in the mortgage market: re￿nancing the mortgage involves the payment of a
￿xed transaction cost k. Consumers enter each period with an outstanding debt Mt and
they have to decide whether to re￿nance it or not. If they keep their existing mortgage,
they have to pay to the lender the annual interest on their loan (￿tMt). If they do re￿-
nance, they have to redeem the existing debt and take out a new mortgage Mt+1 ￿ pt,
again with maturity date T. The level of consumption ct is determined by the budget
constraint and wt; ￿t and pt are time varying, but perfectly foreseen. Since saving and
borrowing are precluded by assumption, individuals maximise life-time utility through
their mortgage decision, subject to a budget constraint that depends on whether re￿-
nancing is undertaken or not.
In any period before the ￿nal one the general form of the budget constraint allowing
for mortgage re￿nancing is:
cR
t = wt + (1 ￿ ￿t)Mt+1 ￿ Mt ￿ k (10)
Without re￿nancing, Mt+1 = Mt and k = 0, because no transaction costs have to be
paid. Hence, the budget constraint takes the form:
cNR
t = wt ￿ ￿tMt (11)
Let ￿ be the intertemporal discount factor and u(ct) the per-period utility function. As
18in Angelini and Simmons (2005), in any t < T the value function is the maximum
of the value function with re￿nancing and the value function without any mortgage
re￿nancing:














t ) + ￿Vt+1
The presence of a transaction cost adds complexity to the problem and the optimal
re￿nancing policy becomes much less transparent. Therefore, in what follows I will
present the analytical solution of the problem only in the case of a simple three period
model. The solution is obtained by backward induction.
4.1 T
As in the previous model, in the last period the house is sold and any outstanding
mortgage is redeemed, so that there is no issue of re￿nancing for period T + 1, but




T = cT = wT + pT ￿ MT ￿ kT
19where kT = k if MT > 0 and kT = 0 if MT = 0. The value function takes the form:
VT = V R
T = V NR
T = u(cT) = u(wT + pT ￿ MT ￿ kT) (13)
4.2 T-1
In period T￿1, if no re￿nancing is undertaken, MT = MT￿1 and the budget constraint
is:
cNR
T￿1 = wT￿1 ￿ ￿T￿1MT￿1
In this case the value function is simply:
V NR
T￿1 = u(cNR
T￿1)+￿VT = u(wT￿1￿￿T￿1MT￿1)+￿u(wT+pT￿MT￿1￿kT) (14)
On the contrary, if the consumer chooses to re￿nance, the budget constraint is:
cT￿1 = wT￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿T￿1)MT ￿ MT￿1 ￿ k







T￿1) + ￿VT] (15)
= max
MT
[u(wT￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿T￿1)MT ￿ MT￿1 ￿ k)
+￿u(wT + pT ￿ MT ￿ kT)]




where the consumer redeems any outstanding debt if
(1 ￿ ￿T￿1)u0(wT￿1 ￿ MT￿1 ￿ k) ￿ ￿u0(wT + pT) < 0
she re￿nances to the maximum possible extent if
(1￿￿T￿1)u0(wT￿1+(1￿￿T￿1)pT￿1￿MT￿1￿k)￿￿u0(wT +pT ￿pT￿1￿k) > 0
and she choose a mortgage size that solves
(1 ￿ ￿T￿1)u0(wT￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿T￿1)MT ￿ MT￿1 ￿ k) = ￿u0(wT + pT ￿ MT ￿ k)
otherwise. If the consumer is time neutral (i.e. ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿T￿1) or if the utility function
is separable in k, such as the CARA felicity, then the interior solution for the mortgage
takes the same form as in the case with no transaction costs. It should also be noted
that in the period before the ￿nal one, the individual might have an incentive to redeem
the mortgage in order to be exempted from the payment of the transaction cost at T.
Remark 6 At T ￿ 1 the transaction cost not only determines whether consumers re￿-
nance or not, but it has also an in￿uence on the extent to which they do so.
21Consumers choose not to re￿nance when V NR
T￿1 > V R
T￿1, i.e. if:
u(wT￿1 ￿ ￿T￿1MT￿1) + ￿u(wT + pT ￿ MT￿1 ￿ kT) (16)
> u(wT￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿T￿1)MT ￿ MT￿1 ￿ k) + ￿u(wT + pT ￿ MT ￿ kT)
where MT is the optimal mortgage size. It is noteworthy that the inequality always
holds if MT > MT￿1 > 0 and
(1 ￿ ￿T￿1)(MT ￿ MT￿1) < k
Remark 7 The consumer does not re￿nance when the value of the equity that is opti-
mal to release from the house is lower than the transaction cost that should be paid.
Furthermore, if the optimal mortgage conditional on re￿nancing is such that MT =
MT￿1, then by de￿nition V NR
T￿1 > V R
T￿1.
4.3 T-2
The re￿nancing decision in period T ￿2 is conditional on the mortgage choice at T ￿1
and on MT￿2, whose value can be treated as given in the case of a three period model.
Two major cases can be identi￿ed, depending on the re￿nancing policy at T ￿ 1:
Case 1
Suppose that in T ￿ 1 for the consumer it will be optimal to re￿nance (VT￿1 =
V R
T￿1). Then, the value functions at T ￿ 2 without and with re￿nancing respectively,
22conditional on re￿nancing at T ￿ 1, are given by the following expressions:
V NR
T￿2 = u(cNR
T￿2) + ￿VT￿1 (17)
= u(wT￿2 ￿ ￿T￿2MT￿2)
+￿max
MT
[u(wT￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿T￿1)MT ￿ MT￿2 ￿ k)







T￿2) + ￿VT￿1] (18)
= max
MT￿1
fu(wT￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿T￿2)MT￿1 ￿ MT￿2 ￿ k)
+￿max
MT
[u(wT￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿T￿1)MT ￿ MT￿2 ￿ k)
+￿u(wT + pT ￿ MT ￿ kT)]g
Since k is a constant, if the individual chooses to re￿nance in both period T and T ￿1,
the optimal mortgage size is determined as in the case of no transaction costs (see
section 3). Consumers do not re￿nance if V NR
T￿2 > V R
T￿2:
Case 2
Consider now the case where for the consumer it will not be optimal to re￿nance in
T ￿1 (VT￿1 = V NR
T￿1). Then, the value functions at T ￿2 without and with re￿nancing
23respectively are given by the following expressions:
V NR
T￿2 = u(cNR
T￿2) + ￿VT￿1 (19)
= u(wT￿2 ￿ ￿T￿2MT￿2)




fu(wT￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿T￿2)MT￿1 ￿ MT￿2 ￿ k) (20)
+￿[u(wT￿1 ￿ ￿T￿1MT￿1) + ￿u(wT + pT ￿ MT￿1 ￿ kT)]g
It should be noted that if MT￿1 > MT￿2, then the consumer will not re￿nance if:
(1 ￿ ￿T￿2)(MT￿1 ￿ MT￿2) < k
This is the analogue of remark 11 for period T ￿2. To determine the optimal mortgage
size conditional on re￿nancing, I have to evaluate the sign of the ￿rst derivative of the
value function with respect to MT￿1 :
G(MT￿1) = (1 ￿ ￿T￿2)u0(wT￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿T￿2)MT￿1 ￿ MT￿2 ￿ k)
￿￿T￿1￿u0(wT￿1 ￿ ￿T￿1MT￿1) ￿ ￿
2u0(MT￿1 + k ￿ wT + pT))
Therefore MT￿1 = 0 if G(MT￿1 = 0) < 0; MT￿1 = pT￿2 if G(MT￿1 = pT￿2) >
0; otherwise there is an interior mortgage that solves G = 0:
244.4 Some general results
The aim of this section is to extend some of the results obtained for a simple three
period model to a more general case in which the individual lives for T periods. For
simplicity, I assume that the utility function is isoelastic and takes the form in (7).
First, suppose that at t the consumer chooses to pay off the existing debt and take














T￿t(wT + pT ￿ Mt+1 ￿ kT)1￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
g
and the ￿rst order condition is:





s￿t￿s(ws ￿ ￿sMt+1)￿￿ ￿ ￿
T￿t(wT + pT ￿ Mt+1 ￿ kT)￿￿
Not surprisingly, the higher the number of periods in which the consumer will not
re￿nance, the lower the amount of equity that it is optimal to withdraw from the house
in the current period. In fact, to take out a maximum mortgage has a positive effect in
the short-run (current consumption jumps), but a negative effect in all future periods in
which the individual will have to pay to the lender the annual interest on the loan.
Furthermore, as stated in remark 11, the consumer does not re￿nance the mortgage
when the amount of equity that it would be optimal to release from the house is lower
25than the cost that should be paid to do so. In other words, the optimal re￿nancing policy
follows an (S,s) rule, characterised by infrequent adjustments. In fact, if the transac-
tion cost is high, consumers re￿nance only when the optimal value of the mortgage
substantially departs from the actual current value. On the contrary, if the optimal and
current values are not remarkably different, agents chooses to re￿nance solely if this
involves the payment of a negligible transaction cost. In the limit case where k = 0,
individuals adjust to the optimal stock of debt immediately and the optimal mortgage
policy is the one described in section 3.
5 Calibrated simulations
The closed-form solution derived in this paper provides an easy way to evaluate the
effects of changing parametric values on the optimal re￿nancing decision. In this sec-
tion I present some calibrated simulations of the optimal life-time mortgage choice of
an individual who lives for 40 periods (T = 40) and whose only asset in the portfolio
is the house where she lives. I run the simulations for the case of an isoelastic utility
function with ￿ = 0:2. Annual wages are hump-shaped and are de￿ned by:







I also assume that in the initial period the mortgage is equal to the house price, with
p1 = 1:75 ￿ w1.
In the ￿rst simulation I assume a growing pro￿le of house prices. In ￿gure 3 and 4
I plot labour income, house prices, the mortgage rate and the optimal mortgage choice
26of two individuals who differ only with respect to their rate of time preference. In the
￿rst part of their life, when both wages and house prices are expected to be growing,
agents use mortgage equity withdrawal to ￿nance their consumption needs: individuals
can increase their outstanding debt in every period because they know that they will be
able to pay the interest rates on the new mortgage (wages are growing). However, the
more patient individual (￿gure 3) slightly decreases the level of the loan in periods in
which the mortgage rate is high, while the other chooses to re￿nance to the maximum
possible extent in every period. In the second half of their life, both individuals tend to
decrease or increase their debt position depending on the mortgage rate, but they differ
with respect to the amount of equity that they inject or withdraw from the house: the
level of indebtness of the less patient individual (￿gure 4) is always higher than that
of the other consumer. Towards the end of life consumers increase their mortgage in
every period to ￿nance consumption because they know that at T the house will be sold
at a high price and they will be able to pay off the debt.













Figure 3 ￿ = 0:94













Figure 4 ￿ = 0:92
In the second simulation house prices ￿uctuate over time and are given by:
pt+1 = pt + "t where "t ￿ U(￿0:1;0:1) and p1 = 1:75 ￿ w1




























Figure 6. ￿ = 0:92
When house prices ￿uctuate over time and wages are growing, the more impatient
individual, whose mortgage choice is represented in ￿gure 6, never pays off the out-
standing debt, even in periods in which the mortgage rate (i.e. the cost of the loan)
is particularly high. However, she is forced to redeem the mortgage when wages start
to decrease because otherwise she would not be able to pay to the lender the annual
interest on the loan. Only towards the end of life this more impatient consumer can
increase her debt position, which she will repay in the last period with the proceedings
given by the sale of the house. Figure 5 shows the mortgage choice of a more patient
individual who prefers to resort less to mortgage re￿nancing because she attaches a
greater value to the future and she knows that to release a large amount of equity from
the house today implies having to pay high interests on the loan in all future periods.
Note that in both simulations consumers are more likely to withdraw a large amount
29of equity from their properties when both house prices and wages are expected to be
growing. Certainly, the extent to which they do so depends also on other parameters,























Figure 7 represents the optimal re￿nancing policy and life-time consumption of a
time neutral individual with ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿ = 0:93. It is noteworthy that in this case
the consumer chooses a bang-bang solution (either a 0 or a 100% mortgage) in most
periods of her life. In such periods, even if the individual is time-neutral and she would
like to smooth consumption over time, she is prevented from doing so by the upper and
lower bounds on the amount that can be borrowed.
306 Conclusions
The percentage of homeowners in the UK is about 70 percent. Consumers hold a large
fraction of their wealth in housing, but they do not trade frequently because of high
pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs. However, home equity can act as a ￿nancial buffer:
through remortgaging, investors can release equity from the value of their home either
to invest in other assets in order to adjust their portfolio or for consumption smoothing
purposes. In this paper I have analysed the optimal mortgage re￿nancing policy of a
homeowner who cannot save and who can borrow only using the house as collateral
for secured loans. Since in the model there are no other assets but the house, the only
reason why investors remortgage is to smooth consumption. The results of the model
show that, when current income is low with respect to future income, agents respond
by withdrawing equity from the house to smooth consumption. Therefore, it might be
optimal to re￿nance even in a world of stable or rising interest rates.
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In what follows I want to prove that the term in parentheses is equal to 0. Let us start



































33Consider now the term
@Mt+2
@Mt+1, where Mt+2 2 [0;pt+1] and suppose that the size of
the mortgage at t + 2 depends on the size of the mortgage at t + 1.
Mt+2 =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if Mt+1 2 A
f(Mt+1) if Mt+1 2 B
pt+1 if Mt+1 2 C







> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
0 if Mt+1 2 A
f 0(Mt+1) if Mt+1 2 B



























= u0(ct)(1 ￿ ￿t) ￿ ￿u0(ct+1)
that proves proposition 1.
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